Investment rates in China have often been highest under leftist (hardline) political regimes, not rightist (softline) political regimens.
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Socialist economic growth in China and Eastem * Why investment hunger is an inevitable Europe has long been characterized by invest-consequence of social planners' rational chioices. ment hunger, drives toward expansion, and cyclical fluctuation of investment rates. * When a drive toward expansion can cause a permanent shortage of consumption goods. For decades, relatively high groA ratesoften accompanied by a shortage of consumption
Through numerical examples and empirical goodshave typically been achieved at the tests, Zou provides a framework w:thin which to consumers' expense.
analyze political investment cycles in a socialist economy. In China, Zou linds that high invest-Treating social planners as self-interested ment rates have often been linked to leftist (or bureaucrats, Zou ofi'rs a positive model to help hardline) political regimes and low or moderate understand the norms of socialist economic investment rates with "rightist" (or so[tline) growth. This model demonstrates:
political regimes.
H flow rapid capital accumulation tends to serve the social planners' own interests.
Socialist Economic Growth and ?o)'tical Investment Cycles
By Heng-fu Zou In tradltlonal optimal growth models for a centrally planned economy, e. g. Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) , social planners maximize an lntertemporal soclal welfare function defined on per capita consumption, subject to the dynamic constraint of capital accumulation. The results from these models have become the folklore of modern economics: there exists a unique optimum path converging asymptotically to the unique equilibrium; the optimum capital stock in long-run Is determined by the famous modified golden rule, I.e., marginal productivity of capital is equal to the natural growth rate of population plus the time discount rate of social planners. In these models, social planners all act In the Interest of the society. They do not have any objective function other than the welfare of the people, and their personal Images are only reflected In the time discount rate. Cass (1965) 1 utility Index of current consumption per capita ....
The central planning authority recognizes that consumption tomorrow is not the same thing as :onsumption today. For thls reason, It takes the politically pragmatic view that its planning obligation is stronger to present and near future generations than to far removed future generations. This view is implemented .n practice by discounting future welfare at a positive rate".
This approach to socialist growth suffers .rom serious limitations when compared to socialist reality. First of all, traditional optimal growth models are based on an insufficient understanding or InH ed, a misunderstanding of the nature of the social planners. This point has been emphasized by Janos Kornal In his various studles ( Kornal, 1982 ( Kornal, , 1986 ( Kornal, , 1988 . With both political power and economic resources in their control, social planners are not constrained or directed to choose the optimum feasible growth path with respect to the only criterion, which Is to maximize social welfare. "Such an unworldly bureaucracy never existed in the past and will never exist In the future.
Political bureaucracies have Inner conflicts reflecting the divisions of society and the diverse pressures of varlous social groups. They pursue their own Individual and group Interests, Including the Interests of the particular specialized agency to which they belong. Power creates an irresistable temptation to make use of it. A bureaucrat must be interventionist because that Is his role in the society; It Is dictated by his situation" (Kornai 1986 (Kornai , pp. 1726 . In practice, social planners are often investment growth rate maximizers (Grosfeld, 1987) , and their personal interests are more connected to the persistent expansion of their organizations than to the Increase In people's consumption. In their investment trategies, "the highest priority is placed on Industry, and within industry on heavy industry, and within heavy Industry on the part related to 2 the military. ... Anztong the neglected, non-priority sectors, one typically finds agriculture, and even more so all the branches of the tertiary or service sector, such as transport and telecommunication, housing, other communal services, domestic trade, and health. This diversion of resources from consumption to Investment takes place not provisionally for two or three years, but for decades, for twenty, thirty, or forty years". (Kornal, 1988, p.2 4 4) .
In this paper, we intend to offer a simple alternative model to capture certain essential aspects of socialist economic growth. In Section III, we demonstrate that this simple model provides good framework for the understanding of "Investment hunger" and "expansion-drive" studied by Kornal (1980) . Section IV derives a theory of polltical Investment cycle frcm our basic model. It Is shown that the investment rates (or accumulation rates
In the terminology of socialist economics) are related to different political regimes In socialist countries. In Section V, we will look at the empirical In later sections, we will allow x to take different values, and its effects on capital accumulation, the Investment rate and const..Iption will be studied. Furthermore, for technical reason, we assume that the second order derivatives of u(.) and v(.) are negative, and that:
which guarantee the sufficiency of the first order condltions for optimization, and exclude the corner solution of zero consumption.
In modelling the social planners' preference, we maintain that social planners to the minlsters at the top. According to Janos Kornal (1981, 1386, 1988) . the first and the most important otivation for accelerated capital accumulation Is the Identification of social planners with their own Jobs. An expansion of the firm or organization under tl'Ir direct control is always a source of satisfaction. The second motivation is prestige. "A la -er organization brings more prestige, and also more power" (Kornal, 1981) . "Tha simple urge to exert power over people, and to exercise some discretion over the allocatlon of physical resources can also make managers strive for higher Investment levels for their firm" (Kornal, 1988, p.264) . So "it Is lmportant to note that Investment hunger and expansion drive characterize not only the behavior of the top manager and his subordlnates In a particular firm, but also the attitude of economic agents at all levels of the bureaucratic hlRrarchy in a socialist system.... the general ideology of the system favors expansion, and no claimant's application for funds is ever regarded as unreasonable or unethical by anyone in the hierarchy. On the contrary, everyone considers such a request as the natural and normal behavior within the system." (Kornal, 1988, pp.264-265, Italic added.) This assessment of socialist planners Is essentially th. ;-ne as the one used
In the analysis of bureaucrats in western democracies. For example, Orzechowski (1977) defines the bureaucrat's utility function directly on the output produced by his bureau and the capltal stock or labor In his control.
And the striving for more budget revenue In western public sectors resembles the Investment hunger and expansion drive In rocialist economies.
With these discussions, we might call w which appeared in the social planners' utility function as the measure of the degree of expansion drive. A large value of x means that the social planners are highly expansion oriented; and a S zero value of n brlngs us back to Ramsay-Cass-Koopman's mathematical utopia of socialism. (Phelps (1961) To proceed with our model, we assume that the social planners maximlze the following lntertemporal *tility with discounting (for notation convenlence, we omit the time subscript t of all variables from not on):
(1) 0 where p Is the social planners' subjective rate of discount.
There Is a standard neoclassical production function f(k) In the economy with f'(k) > 0, and f"(k) < 0. Capital Is subject to a depreciation rate 6. The population growth rate Is exogenously given as n. So capital accumulation in per capita term follows the dynamic equation:
Social planners maximize (1) subject to the dynamic constraint (2). The current value Hamiltonian H is defined by:
The optimal paths for consumption and investment are:
We are going to make a detailed analysis of above dynamics In the next sf:ct Ion.
III. The Dynamics of the Model and the Properties u the Equilibrium
As noted by Kurz (1968), the dynamic systems (4) and (5) 
Denote the 2x2 matrix as M. The trace of the matrix:
Trace of M = p > 0 .
As the t-ace Is the sum of the two char-cteristic roots of the systems, at least one of the roots is positive. Therefore we cannot have a stable equilibrium point.
Next the determinant of the matrix Is:
The seoond term on the right hand side of (9) Is negative; the first term in positive or negative depending on wihether the capital stock is smaller or larger than the golden rule capital as pointed out by Kurz (1968) . If the steady state cap!tal stock is equal to or larger than the golden rule capital, f'(k) is equal to or less than n + 6; the flrst term on the right hand side cf (9) is also negative because [n+6+p-4"(k I is positive as shown below in proposition one. In this case, A Is negative. For A is the product of two characteristic roots, negative A Implies that one root Is pos'tive and one negative. If A Is positive, then both roots will bw positive as the existence of two negative roots contradicts (8). For this section, we will focus .. n the case that A is negative, that is to say, there exists a unique optimal path in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Furthermure, we assume that there exists only one equilibrium for the systems. A numerical example is presented in the next section before we go on to discuss the political Investment cycle. Of course, If the time discount rate Is very small, the first term on the right hand side of (9) Is negative; so Is A.
The properties of the unique saddle point equilibrium follow In order:
Property One: The equilibrium capital stock Is larger than the modified golden rule one.
To show this, note that, in a steady state, we have:
Earn (10):.
where k m denotes the modified golden rule amount of capital. From (12), it Is clear that k > kmg as f"(.) Is negative. The explanation Is simple. Since
:ocial planners benefit dlrtctly from the expansion of the eco Jmic organizations and since the welfare of consumers over the lnfinlte horizon is not the only criterion for planning, the short-riin consumption will be partly sacrified for the expanslon drive. It is quite possible that, as shown In next numerical example, consumotion Is permanently sacrificed In this kind of models: equilibrium consumption Is lower than the golden rule one and capital is over-accumulated.
Property Two: The higher the value of n, the higher the steady state capital.
Totally differentiating equations (10) and (l1J, we have:
It is simple to show that:
dir a U (c which Is positive as the economy is on the unique optimal convergent path. As for the steady state consumption, the sign Is ambiguous depending on whether the equilibrium capital Is higher or lower than the golden rule capital.
The effects of n on Investment and consumption on the unique optimal path can ~lsu be analyzed. From (7), the solutions of the linearized systems for the :.et;ivlor of the capital stock and consumption are:
where 9 Is the negative root of the dynamic system:
2
From (16) and (17), It is clear that, through Its positive effect on steady state capital, k , the high value of n leads to high investment and low consumption on the optimal path for all kt less than k . But we should note that t may also affect e and c . If the increase In i tends to lower e, lr.
other words, e becomes more negative, then the Investment will be unambiguously high as a :esult of t being high.
Property Three: The higher the value of n, the higher the steady state investment rate (cs-saving rate).
In the steady state, Investment Is Just (n + 8)k . Let the investment rate (or saving rate) be s, then: ther-e are two groups of social planners in the economy. Fvlh.,wg n,
.nt ion, we may .. :aII cne group "softliners" or the "right", and Aho ' : ir',ers' or the ''left" Threy ilternat ively control the pr esn, . .
,an
I Ils kriown thtalt in siocIalIst countries sUCIh as H'ng.iry, * ? ts wa,r,d;s (rc<.;umpt Ion rather than investmenrt alw:.ys come ar , * .'t ,f" "softl.ine' rule; the "hardliners" or the "left' are always *'xpcinsion oriented. (see Kornal, 1988, pp. 283-284) . In our model, if we :'he initial capital stock is the same for both g.oups: ko = k. To avoid t'.e problem of time Inconsistency, we assume that the "left" and the "right" both -cmmit to the optimal programs they calculate at time zero, and make no -hanges later on.
From the calculations above, It Is easy to obtain that In steady state k1 > kr c < c (38) From (32), the steady state investment rate for the "left' is always larger than the one for the "right". If the "left" Is In power, the economy experiences higher investment and lower consumption; If the "right" Is in Figure I where E 1 and Er are equilibrium points for the "left" and the "right"
respectively. If the economy is currently In El, the power shift from the "left" to the "right" results In an immmediate upward Jump In consumption and in a reduction of investment; the new long-run equilibrium Is Er where capital stock Is lower than, but consumption Is higher than, the equilibrium levels at E l The Investment rates fluctuate following the political power shifts. This is a demonstration of political Investment cycles at steady states.
Investment cycles can also happen on the paths converging to the steady states. In Figure II , Pr and P are the optimal convergent pathes for the 'right" and the "left" respectively.
c Figure II .f the economy is Initially on the path for the "right" P , a change in Dlitical regime from the "right' to the "left" leads to an immediate Jowrnward Xiaoping. They were known as the capitalist representatives In the communist party during the Cultural Revolution. The power struggles between the "left" and the "right" have shaped the hlstory of China In the past four decades, and their effects can be seen in every aspect of Chinese society. Our present focus Is on the effects of these struggles on the Investment rates.
The following table contains relevent data for our analysis. In the table, the power over economic planning Is represented by a dummy variable; a value of zero means that the "right" controls the planning board, while a value of one means that the "left" controls the planning. The term "productive Investment" is special to Marxist and socialist economics, and needs some explanation. It refers to Investment that directly serves material production or meets the needs of materlal production. Its counterpart Is non-productive Investment, which includes Investment on public utilities, nousing, pub'ic health, social welfare and education. Since non-productive investment Is more or less related to people's consumption, especially durable and public consumption, the percentage of productive investmt in total
Investment outlay is a more accurate measure of accumulation. The fluctuations in inves.ment rate and the productive investment rate are depicted In Figure   III below. (a value of one refers to the "left" regime and a value of zero the "right" 20 regime), and PI.= share of productive Investment In total investment. E:quations (.9) and (40) both show that political changes have substantial effects on the investment rate and the productive investment rate. 1he positive coefficients say that a "left" regime causes high rates, and a 'right" regime leads to low rates. As Invest.ient projects ofteni last for a few years, the lagged varlables also help to explain the rates. Second, political factors as an exogenous variable cannot fully exolain all fluctuations in Investment rates; a theory espoused by T. Bauer (1978) and
Tanos Kornal (1980, 1988) , which we may call as model of endogenous investment .,ycles, has developed to explain investment cycles under the same political regime. The focus of this theory Is to relate the Investment rate to the intensity of shortage In the economy. Social planners will reduce the Investment rate when shortage intensity Is high, and raise the Investment rate when shortage intensity Is low. For a model developed In this line, see Zou (1990) . These two theories of investment cycles should be taken as complementary, and "they can be usefully and effectively placed side by side and, taken together, they do a good Job not only of explaining the regular pattern of the cycle, but also of explalning Its Irregularities" (Kornai, 1988, P.284) .
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have offered a positive growth model that sheds considerable light on the "norms" of socialist growth, such -s investment hunger, expansion drive, chronic shortage and Investment cycles. This model also provides an analytical framework within which to study the relationship between Investment fluctuations and political changes In socialist countries.
Preliminary empirical work on China has provided strong support for this approach.
